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The Debate Over Autonomous
Weapons Systems
Dr. Gregory P. Noone and Dr. Diana C. Noone 1
The debate over Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) has
begun in earnest with advocates for the absolute and immediate
banning of AWS development, production, and use arguing
AWS should be banned because these systems lack human
qualities, such as the ability to relate to other humans and to
apply human judgment, that are necessary to comply with the
law. In addition, the weapons would not be constrained by the
capacity for compassion, which can provide a key check on the
killing of civilians. The opposing viewpoint in this debate
articulates numerous arguments that generally include: it is far
too premature and too speculative to make such a
proposal/demand; the Law of Armed Conflict should not be
underestimated in its ability to control AWS development and
future operations; AWS has the potential to ultimately save
human lives (both civilian and military) in armed conflicts;
AWS is as inevitable as any other technology that could
potentially make our lives better; and to pass on the opportunity
to develop AWS is irresponsible from a national security
perspective. The purpose of this article is to help refine the
AWS debate.

1.

Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Ph.D., J.D. is the Director of the National
Security and Intelligence Program at Fairmont State University and an
Associate Professor of Political Science and Law. He is a United States
Navy Captain with nearly 25 years service as a judge advocate. Dr.
Diana C. Noone, Ph.D., J.D. is the Chair of Social Sciences in the
College of Liberal Arts at Fairmont State University and an Associate
Professor of Criminal Justice. She has previously served at the
Department of Justice in the National Institute of Justice. The authors
would like to thank Dr. Adam Podlaskowski, Assistant Professor of
Philosophy, Fairmont State University for his invaluable input, Rachel
Pruden for her research assistance, Richard Wanerman and all of the
Case Western student editors. This article benefited greatly from the
suggestions, comments, and editing of Russell J. Verby, Rymn J.
Parsons, Amber S. Ward, William J. Morrison, Justin R. Valentino and
Peggy Britton. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and
should not be understood as representing those of the U.S. Department
of Defense or any other governmental or non-governmental entity. This
article is in honor of LT John Snyder, United States Navy, and
Villanova University, Class of 1987. LT Snyder and nine of his
shipmates were killed on October 30, 1990 while serving this great
nation onboard the USS Iwo Jima.

25

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons Systems

CONTENTS
I. Introduction..................................................................................26
II. What are Autonomous Weapons Systems? ..................................27
III. Common Ground ..........................................................................29
A. Law of Armed Conflict ...................................................................29
B. Human Error ................................................................................31
C. Machines Instead Of Humans..........................................................32
IV. Technology .................................................................................33
V. Conclusion....................................................................................35

I. Introduction
The debate over Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) has begun
in earnest with advocates for the absolute and immediate banning of
AWS development, production, and use planting their flag first. They
argue that AWS should be banned because these systems lack human
qualities, such as the ability to relate to other humans and to apply
human judgment, that are necessary to comply with the law. In
addition, the weapons would not be constrained by the capacity for
compassion, which can provide a key check on the killing of civilians.2
The opposing viewpoint in this debate articulates numerous
arguments that generally include: it is far too premature and too
speculative to make such a proposal/demand; the Law of Armed
Conflict should not be underestimated in its ability to control AWS
development and future operations; AWS has the potential to
ultimately save human lives (both civilian and military) in armed
conflicts; AWS is as inevitable as any other technology that could
potentially make our lives better; and to pass on the opportunity to
develop AWS is irresponsible from a national security perspective.3
Some of the most respected and brilliant lawyers in this field are on
opposite sides of this argument. The purpose of this article is to help
refine the AWS debate.

2.

See HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER
ROBOTS 2, 4 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/ sites/default/
files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf

3.

Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”:
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 234 (2013).
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II. What are Autonomous Weapons Systems?
The International Committee of the Red Cross defines
Autonomous Weapon Systems as weapons that can “independently
select and attack targets, i.e. with autonomy in the ‘critical functions’
of acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets.” 4 The U.S.
Department of Defense defines AWS as: “a weapon system that, once
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention
by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous
weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to
override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage
targets without further human input after activation.” 5
AWS is not artificial intelligence. 6 There will not be “human
qualities such as consciousness, emotion, sociability, semantic
understanding required for human moral decision making.” 7 AWS also
isn’t a Terminator science fiction movie scenario. 8 “SkyNet” is not
going to take over the world. 9 Unless of course you think we are from
the future and we’re here to convince you autonomous weapon
systems should be developed and trust us there is no Terminator
scenario. In that case, have Sarah Connor give us a call. 10 “The
autonomous robots being discussed for military applications are closer
in operation to your washing machine than to a science fiction
Terminator. The way the term ‘autonomy’ is used in robotics should
not be confused with how the term is used in philosophy, politics,
individual freedom or in common parlance. It is more related to the
term automatic. An automatic robot carries out a pre-programmed
4.

INT’L CMTE. RED CROSS [ICRC], AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS:
TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL, AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 7 (2014).

5.

See Autonomy in Weapon Systems, DoDI 3000.09 (Nov. 2, 2012).

6.

Matt McFarland, Elon Musk: ‘With artificial intelligence we are
POST
(Oct.
24,
2014),
summoning
the
demon,’
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/10/24/elo
n-musk-with-artificial-intelligence-we-are-summoning-the-demon/,
(addressing the comparison of artificial intelligence to “summoning the
demon.”).

7.

See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING
ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 9 (2009).

8.

See Gabi Siboni & Yoni Eshpar, Dilemmas in the Use of Autonomous
Weapons, 16 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 75, 75 (2014) (addressing cultural
anxiety toward autonomous weapons systems due to movies in popular
culture like The Terminator).

9.

SkyNet is a fictional self-aware artificial intelligence robot that is The
Terminator’s main antagonist. TERMINATOR (Hamdale Film Corporation
1984).

10.

Sarah Connor is one of the film’s protagonists. Id.
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sequence of operations or moves in a structured environment. A good
example is a robot painting a car.” 11
Autonomous Weapon Systems would be able to select and engage
targets without human involvement in an unstructured environment.
This is really the crux of the argument. Should weapons be developed
that do not have a human in the “loop” (i.e. a closed “loop” system)?
There are three types of weapon systems and they are generally
described as:
1. Human-in-the-loop or semi-autonomous systems require a
human to direct the system to select a target and attack it, such
as Predator or Reaper UAVs.
2. Human-on-the loop or human-supervised autonomous systems
are weapon systems that select targets and attack them, albeit
with human operator oversight; examples include Israel’s Iron
Dome and the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx Close In Weapons System
(or CIWS).
3. Human-out-of-the-loop or fully autonomous weapon systems
can attack without any human interaction; there are currently
no such weapons. 12

Similarly the U.S. Navy characterizes autonomous weapons in
terms of mission complexity. “Supervised” weapons have human
operators making the decisions (i.e. “human-in-the-loop” such as
UAVs), “scripted” weapons carry out a “pre-planned script of the
‘point, fire and forget’ variety” (e.g. CIWS), and “intelligent” systems
that are fully autonomous. 13 The U.S. Department of Defense has
directed that “[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems
shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” 14 They
also make it clear that all AWS should not be viewed in isolation but
“considered in terms of human-system collaboration” (i.e. all
supervised by human operators at some level and designed to be
readily understandable to those trained operators). 15

11.

Noel Sharkey, Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous Targeting, 9 J. MIL.
ETHICS 369, 376 (2010).

12.

See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 1, at 2; see also Michael N. Schmitt,
Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A
Reply to the Critics, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231 (2013).

13.

See Sharkey, supra note 10, at 377.

14.

See Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 11, at 6.

15.

See id.
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III. Common Ground
A. Law of Armed Conflict

First and foremost, there is immediate common ground to be
found in this debate. Any weaponry development shall be done so in
accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC, also referred to
as International Humanitarian Law, IHL, or the Law of War). With
respect to AWS, its development and deployment would be required
to adhere to LOAC’s core principles of distinction, proportionality,
humanity and military necessity. 16 There is readily accepted treaty
law as well as customary international law that makes this area of
discussion easy. AWS is, as all weapons and weapon systems are, a
means of warfare (whereas a method of warfare involves deployment
and tactics). All AWS would have a legal review conducted prior to
formal development as a weapon (or prior to any modification of an
existing weapon) and another legal review prior to being deployed in
the field. 17 Therefore, the concept of AWS is not per se unlawful. At
their core, autonomous weapon systems must be able to distinguish
combatants from noncombatants as well as friend from foe. LOAC is
designed to protect those who cannot protect themselves, and an
underlying driver is to protect civilians from death and combatants
from unnecessary suffering. 18 Everyone is in agreement on this. No
academic or practitioner is stating anything to the contrary; therefore,
this part of any argument from either side must be ignored as a red
herring. Simply put, no one would agree to any weapon that ignores
LOAC obligations. 19
Some argue on behalf of AWS development and usage on the
claim it can reduce human casualties, collateral damage, and war
crimes by making war less inhumane through lessening the human
element from warfare. 20 Future AWS may perform better than
humans because when combatants do violate LOAC it is usually for
one or more of several reasons and among those reasons are fear,
16.

Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 11, at 29; see also
LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY
CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR (2013).

17.

Schmitt, supra note 11 at 29.

18.

See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2010).

19.

Of course we must recognize that there are current weapons that remain
points of contention with respect to LOAC (e.g. white phosphorous and
cluster munitions) but the conversation continues, and the focus on the
legal deployment of such weapons is constant and in some cases possible
elimination, or at the very least limitations, may be achieved.

20.

Ronald C. Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned
Systems, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 332, 332–339 (2010).
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anger, frustration, revenge, fatigue, stress, and self-preservation.21
This is the same rationale for the effectiveness of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs or the misnomer “drones”) in complying with LOAC
in armed conflicts. UAV operators do not have self-preservation
concerns forcing them to make a split second decision on whether to
pull the trigger. They have the ability to circle around and acquire
more information from multiple sources that will allow them to make
the best decision possible. 22 UAV operators are also considerably less
likely to succumb to emotion and the other stresses experienced in a
combat environment. 23 Overall, AWS could potentially remove much
of the unpredictability of human behavior in the battlespace.
Of course, developing and deploying AWS that have the
capability to adhere to LOAC while accomplishing the mission is
indeed the challenge to any such technology. “If an autonomous
system is to minimize harm, it must also be ‘cognizant’ of possible
harmful consequences of its actions, and it must select its actions in
light of the ‘knowledge’ even if such terms are only metaphorically
applied to machines.” 24 Frankly, it may be impossible to develop such
a capability, and if not impossible, it is decades away, if not scores of
years away and perhaps a century or more. This leads to another area
of agreement and that is the lack of immediacy in the AWS debate.
No designers, engineers, academics, or practitioners believe we will see
a deployable AWS within ten or twenty years – at the least.25
Without a doubt, we should be discussing future weaponry, and the
engineers who design and create AWS must do so with a clear
understanding of LOAC principles, but any attempt to outright ban a
weapon still in the concept stage is not practical as there are far too
many variables in the development of AWS to fully appreciate and
understand what AWS may ultimately look like. 26
The final piece of the LOAC argument that has been raised is
accountability, as in, “Who will be accountable for autonomous
weapon systems that commit a LOAC violation?” Although on its
21.

See id. at 333; see also Ryan Tonkens, The Case Against Robotic
Warfare: A Response to Arkin, 11 J. MIL. ETHICS 149, 152–55 (2012).

22.

Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (Armed
Drones) and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft
Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. INT’L L. J. 595, 597 (2012).

23.

Arkin, supra note 19, at 333.

24.

See Wallach & Allen supra note 7, at 17.

25.

See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems and
International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. FEATURES 37 (2013).

26.

There was an outright ban on permanently blinding lasers before they
were used in the field, but there is little precedent to ban weapons prior
to development. See id. at 36.
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face it appears to be a point of contention – it is not. All lawyers in
this conversation agree that anyone who commits a LOAC violation
should be held accountable (i.e. in the AWS scenario that may be the
system programmer) and anyone in a superior / command position
who knew or should have known about the violation may be held
accountable as well. 27
In sum, the “rise of autonomous weapons is creating
understandable concern for the international community as it is
impossible to predict exactly what will happen with the technology.
This uncertainty has led some to advocate for a preemptive ban on
the technology. Yet the emergence of a new means of warfare is not a
unique phenomenon and is assumed within the Law of Armed
Conflict.” 28
B. Human Error

More common ground may be found in that all parties also agree
that human error exists and that we collectively strive to eliminate
the pain and suffering caused by such error. We have investigated
civilian train, ferry, and airline crashes such as the 1985 Japan
Airlines that killed 520 people, caused by improper maintenance
techniques. 29 We try and compensate for poor witness identification
in criminal cases that may lead to the death penalty for an accused.
Every civilian law enforcement shooting is thoroughly reviewed.
Human error in the medical field results in 100-200 deaths every day
in the United States that may lead to litigation and extensive
discovery. 30
Likewise, in the military, human error has claimed more than its
share of lives. A deadly steam fire onboard the USS IWO JIMA killed
ten sailors because the civilian maintenance crew used brass nuts
instead of steel ones on a steam valve. 31 In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq
27.

Kenneth Anderson and Matthew P. Waxman, Law and Ethics for
Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the
Laws of War Can 16–17 (Am. U. Wash. Coll. L., Research Paper No.
2013–11).

28.

Shane Reeves and William J. Johnson, Autonomous Weapons: Are You
Sure These are Killer Robots? Can We Talk About It?, ARMY LAW.,
April, 2014, at 27.

29.

Mark Johanson, Worst Plane Crashes in History and Their Aftermath,
INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2013 10:54 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
worst-plane-crashes-history-their-aftermath-1315189.

30.

Wallach & Allen supra note 7, at 22.

31.

See, e.g., Jodi Enda, Bahrainian Blamed in Fatal Ship Blast the 1990
Explosion Was Due to Faulty Repair, a Report Says. Rep. Andrews
Charges the Navy Broke the Law, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 14, 1992),
http://articles.philly.com/1992-08-14/news/25989895_1_navy-reportrepair-ships-ships-at-american-shipyards.
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war, in which the U.S. was supporting Iraq, the USS STARK did not
adequately identify a threat from an Iraqi fighter jet, that
(supposedly) misidentified the STARK as an Iranian ship, and as a
result 37 sailors died when two 1,500-pound Exocet missiles impacted
the ship. 32 As a result of the STARK’s under reaction error, the next
year the USS VINCENNES had an overreaction of human error and
shot down an Iranian civilian Airbus A300 in the Persian Gulf, killing
all the civilian passengers and crew. The VINCENNES believed the
airplane was descending into an attack profile and was identified as a
military aircraft by its “squawk” transmission, when in reality it was
ascending after takeoff en route to Dubai and was recorded with a
civilian squawk. 33
Nearly all friendly fire incidents are the result of human error.
The friendly fire that shot down of a pair of U.S. Army Blackhawks
by U.S. Air Force F-15’s in northern Iraq’s “No Fly Zone” in 1994
was the result of human error by the AWACS crew as well as the F15’s that made visual contact prior to shooting. 34 U.S. Army Ranger,
and former NFL player, Pat Tillman was killed in Afghanistan as a
result of human error by his fellow unit members when he was
misidentified as the enemy in a firefight in 2004. 35 “Such tragedies
demonstrate that a man in the loop is not a panacea during situations
in which it may be difficult to distinguish civilians and civilian objects
from combatants and military objectives. Those who believe otherwise
have not experienced the fog of war.” 36 In short, human error causes
untold deaths – perhaps AWS can perform better.
C. Machines Instead Of Humans

Even more common ground in this debate is the fact that both
sides agree there should not be a “robot army” fighting “robot wars.”
The U.S. Department of Defense has made it clear AWS will not
replace humans in combat but will instead reduce their exposure to
life threatening tasks (such as at check points dealing with suicide
32.

See Officer Errors Reportedly Left USS Stark Vulnerable, CHI. TRIB.
(Jun. 1, 1987), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-06-01/news/
8702100123_1_sea-skimming-radar-warning-receiver-exocet.

33.

George C. Wilson, Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jetliner, WASH. POST
(Jul. 4, 1988), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/
flight801/stories/july88crash.htm.

34.

Iver Peterson, Court-Martial Begins in ‘Friendly Fire’ Deaths in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/ 1995/06/03/us/
court-martial-begins-in-friendly-fire-deaths-in-iraq.html.

35.

Josh White, Tillman Killed by ‘Friendly Fire’, WASH. POST (Jun 30,
2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A444-2004
May29.html.

36.

Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 11, at 13.
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bombers) and reduce the potential cognitive overload of operators and
supervisors. 37
Another area of agreement can be found in that both sides of this
debate understand the inherent weaknesses in AWS. Any system is
subject to breakdowns, malfunctions, glitches, interference (i.e.
hacking by the enemy or others), and beyond those mechanical issues
in a conflict setting, information / intelligence will always be the
Achilles’ heel of any tasking and deployment of any weapon system.
One rather interesting argument against AWS replacing human
combatants is that humans are “capable of morally praiseworthy and
supererogatory behavior, exemplified by (for example) heroism in
battle, something that machines may not be capable of… [and]
replacing humans with such machines may also eliminate the
occurrence of soldiers ‘going beyond the call of duty’… [and] unduly
threatens the ability of human soldiers to exhibit morally exceptional
behavior, and undermines important aspects of the military
profession.” 38 This may be true, and a few combatants may seek
combat glory, but 99.99% of combatants simply want to get the
mission done efficiently with the least amount of casualties as
possible. If you are in a situation that requires individuals to “go
beyond” what is asked of them, your situation is probably less than
ideal and the overall environment you’re operating in could be dire.
Another point to be made here is that many medals for heroism are
for defensive actions (i.e. throwing oneself on the grenade to save your
foxhole buddy’s life) and AWS would be ideally suited for a unit’s
overall defensive posture.
Another argument put forth against AWS is that it is
“disrespectful” to be killed by a machine. First and foremost, it is
easy to assume that seeing the man’s eyes as he stabs you doesn’t
make your death any more palatable than the proverbial “you never
hear the round that kills you.” Secondly, we are in an age of over the
horizon weapons, indirect fire, and buried IEDs therefore the concept
of being killed by one type of weapon versus another is somehow more
“respectful” is misplaced.

IV. Technology
Those who argue against AWS must first consider the significant
impact that automated and semi-automated systems have on our dayto-day lives. For example, financial institutions worldwide employ
computer networks that approve or reject millions of transactions

37.

Id. at 6.

38.

Ryan Tonkens, The Case Against Robotic Warfare: A Response to
Arkin, 11 J. MIL. ETHICS 149, 151.
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every minute. 39 Utility grids are controlled by computer systems and
human activity is being facilitated, monitored and analyzed by
computer chips in every conceivable device. 40 Of course, none of these
systems are designed to kill people in combat, but there is an element
of “automation bias” that results in a de facto delegation of
responsibility for decisions to a computer and the result is that
decision support is allowed to become decision making by default. For
example, the APACHE computer based decision support system helps
physicians care for ICU (Intensive Care Unit) patients. It has become
increasingly difficult for even the best physicians to challenge the
“authority” of APACHE. As a result, an open-loop consultation
system essentially becomes a closed loop system where the computer
dictated clinical decisions. 41 Will a highly developed open-loop system
(i.e. with a human in the loop) become hard to countermand? Or
would truly Autonomous Weapon Systems programmed and
thoroughly tested arguably be more reliable? At the very least, if we
don’t develop AWS we need to develop better computer decision
support.
With respect to inevitability argument – society “already have
engineered systems making decisions that affect human’s lives and
have ethical ramifications.” 42 Due to “operator errors and the inability
of humans to monitor the entire state of system software, the
pressures for increased automation will continue to mount.” 43 Other
thinkers raise the “precautionary principle,” which states that,
“humans should err on the side of caution. But few would sacrifice
computer technology advances of the past 50 years for fear of a robot
takeover.” 44 Traffic accidents annually kill on average more than one
and half million people worldwide, so if “people knew how destructive
automobiles would be 100 years ago would they have stopped their
development? Probably not as advantages outweigh disadvantages.”
In sum, “[i]ncreasing reliance on autonomous systems will not
undermine people’s basic humanity. Nor will advanced robots enslave
or exterminate humanity. Humans have always adapted to their
technology and the benefits will outweigh the costs.” 45

39.

Wallach & Allen supra note 7, at 16.

40.

See generally id.

41.

Id. at 40-41.

42.

Id. at 8.

43.

Id. at 32.

44.

Id. at 52.

45.

Id. at 7.
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V. Conclusion
At the present time, there are many questions and as yet few
answers with respect to Autonomous Weapon Systems. Not the least
of which include the policy implications of such systems. For instance,
“How does this technology impact the likely successes of counterinsurgency operations or humanitarian interventions? Does not such
weaponry run the risk of making war too easy to wage and tempt
policy makers into killing when other more difficult means should be
undertaken?” 46 Will countries be more willing to use force because
their populations would have less to lose (i.e. their loved ones) and it
would be politically more acceptable?
An immediate outright ban on AWS is the simplest way forward
as this approach eliminates any issues with research and development,
technology, the law, and policy implications. However, life is not that
easy and the technological development will take place because the
market and political forces will demand the benefits these technologies
can provide. 47 The esteemed Professor Michael Schmitt of the United
States Naval War College sums up the position of those opposed to an
immediate outright ban when he states, “[I]n the absence of even a
single such system being fielded, it is premature to draw conclusions
either as to their legality or to the broader issue of whether they
should be banned as a matter of policy. Understanding of the systems’
potential for both positive and negative ends is simply too primitive
at this time to comfortably draw conclusions as to their legal, moral,
and operational costs and benefits.” 48

46.

Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military,
Bradley Jay Strawser, Oxford University Press, 2013.

47.

Wallach & Allen supra note 7, at 6.

48.

Schmitt supra note 11, at 37.
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